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1. Introduction 
Since 2001, there has been increased attention by the media, politicians, and 
academics on what appears to be overly generous levels of executive compensation 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). One area of research focuses on whether an executive’s 
social network, and in particular those of chief executive officers (CEOs), are associated 
with generous compensation packages (Larker et al., 2005; Barnea and Guedj, 2007; 
Brown et al., 2008; Hwang and Kim, 2009).  This prior literature mainly investigates the 
implications of director ties on the firm’s corporate governance, focusing on the potential 
costs of connections by identifying specific ties between certain individuals that are 
considered more likely to create agency problems for the firm. But are executive’s and 
outsider director’s connections in general always costly for a firm or are there benefits to 
such ties? The social capital literature suggests that connections do have potential 
benefits as they create social networks and these networks facilitate access to a 
broader source of information at a lower cost, and improve its quality, relevance and 
timeliness (Adler and Kwon, 2002). For example, Useem (1984) noted director-
interlocks enable managers to achieve an optimal ‘business scan’ of the latest business 
practices and overall business environment.  
Using this initial insight we examine whether the connectedness of executives 
and outside directors in general provides their respective firms with informational 
resources or merely provides the individuals with ‘managerial power’ which they can 
wield against their firm for their own personal gain. This paper therefore distinguishes 
itself from others in the literature as we do not take a purely monitoring stance to the 
issue of connectedness by only focusing on ties between specific individuals. Rather we  
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investigate the potential value of a director’s overall connectedness—which is 
generated through their position in the UK network of interlocking corporate 
directorships— from both an individual and firm perspective. Specifically, we investigate 
a) whether ‘better’ connected executives and outside directors are remunerated for their 
connectedness and b) whether the aggregate connectedness of these individuals 
provides useful resources to the firm and thereby improves the firm’s future 
performance.  
To examine how an executive’s or outside director’s connections relates to their 
compensation level and, collectively, to their firm’s overall performance, we use social 
capital theory (Burt, 2005). Social capital theory has developed specific theoretical 
mechanisms and measures that explain how an individual’s level (or collectively on a 
firm level) of connectedness contributes to their access to information, ability to 
coordinate actions, and efficacy as a monitoring agent. Focusing on director interlocks, 
we construct various measures of connectedness using techniques developed in social 
network analysis (SNA). Our findings indicate that the better an executive’s or outside 
director’s connectedness, the higher her compensation. This finding suggests that either 
the executives and outside directors are rewarded for providing valuable resources to 
their firms (via their connections), or are rewarded with "managerial power" provided by 
their connections, which creates opportunities to extract economic rents in the form of 
“pay-without-performance” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  
To distinguish between these two explanations, we investigate the relation 
between the connectedness of the firm, as a whole created through the collective ties of 
its board members, and the firm’s future performance. We find that the firm’s executive  
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and outsider director’s aggregate connectedness is positively associated with the firm’s 
future performance. These findings suggest that the executives and outside directors 
are not only rewarded for the resources their connections bring to the firm, but also that 
these aggregate resources are associated with superior firm performance. All the 
findings hold when we include several control variables to proxy for the executives’ and 
outside directors’ individual ‘human capital’. This is especially important since the 
concept of social capital (‘connectedness’) and human capital have clear parallels, 
although they are not identical.   
Although we only focus on observable (formal) ties the social capital literature 
does suggest that social (informal) ties and formal ties such as interlocking board 
directorships typically complement each other (Hwang and Kim, 2009) and frequently 
amplify the effects of different types of ties. Informal social ties such as the ones based 
on club memberships or membership of philanthropic organizations are regarded as 
venues where new-comer board members can be introduced to norms and values of 
corporate boards. Westphal et al. (2006) suggest that ties based on interlocking board 
memberships have effects similar to informal social ties. These interlocking 
directorships, in addition to being assets in their own right, reflect in the corporate realm, 
the directors’ existing social ties.   
It is important to note that, although a director (and collectively a firm) may be 
able to choose who they are directly connected to, the actual network position resulting 
from these connections e.g. ‘connectedness’ is dependent not only on the individual’s 
director connections, but also on who their connections are also connected to. Thus an 
individual cannot directly have control over their connectedness, but can only increase  
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the probability of gaining a desirable network position.
1 Furthermore, we assume that 
the market for directors is not a single market, but a collection of partially overlapping 
markets. Some of the companies, typically in the same industries, compete for the same 
candidates, but, as whole, the pool of directors is not universal. Therefore, there is not a 
single point of equilibrium and there is not a single price (compensation) that would 
clear the market.
2 Hence, different boards would be looking at different network 
positions in accordance to which they offer compensation. Also, since the network is 
composed of partially-overlapping markets, no single board is fully aware of the entire 
network. We do expect boards to have knowledge of their ‘neighbouring’ boards, that is, 
boards with which they share directors or other boards in the same industry. However, 
better-connected directors are likely to be more visible to the board. Thus, although 
boards may not be aware of the entire network, public visibility may serve as a proxy for 
high levels of connectedness. 
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First we provide 
empirical evidence, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, that the better-
connected an executive or outside director is the greater the benefits to the firm. That is 
better-connected firms generate superior future performance. Moreover, the firms 
appear to acknowledge the value of these resources and compensate the individuals for 
them. Unlike previous studies on compensation and individual ties we are able to infer 
                                                 
1 Social capital is ‘located’ not in individuals but in their relations with other individuals (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
No one individual has exclusive ownership rights to social capital. If you or your partner in the relationship 
withdraws, the connection dissolves with whatever social capital is contained (Burt, 1992, p.58). 
2 For example, company A may see directors 1, 2 and 3 as potential candidates for a director’s position. Company B 
may see directors 3, 4, and 5 as candidates. There is competition between A and B over the pay offered to director 3, 
but not over the other directors they consider.  
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that connectedness is beneficial to a firm and does not necessarily result in managerial 
power for the individual. 
Second, we use the entire population of UK listed firms to construct a network, 
and we rely on social capital theory to identify which executives and outside directors 
have the most valuable network resources e.g. who is ‘better’ connected. By employing 
social capital theory and using measures from social network analysis, our paper 
bridges multiple disciplines of research and introduces social ties in general as a new 
determinant of compensation and firm performance. Thus, we present social network 
analysis as a useful tool that researchers can use to examine social connections in 
large scale analysis.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the theory of social 
capital and describe the social network variables we use in this study. In section 3 we 
discuss the prior literature and present our hypotheses. Section 4 presents our sample 
and describes our research design. Section 5 presents the results and several 
sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Social capital and social network measures 
Social capital is a concept that has attracted the attention of scholars who seek to 
explain how individuals mobilize their resources through relationships with others (Adler 
and Kwon, 2002; for a review see Burt, 2001). The concept is based on the notion that 
the actions of individuals are greatly facilitated by their membership in social networks. 
Therefore, social capital can help explain the differential success of individuals and 
firms in their competitive environments (Adler and Kwon, 2002). As Burt (2000) notes,  
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social capital is a metaphor for advantage: people who do better in business are better-
connected in one way or another. For example, research shows that social ties help 
individuals (firms) gain access to information about job opportunities (potential 
employees) (Burt, 1992; Fernandez et al., 2000), new innovations (Burt, 1987), and 
provide a finer grained information set (Uzzi, 1997). Although research shows that 
social capital plays a central role in determining individual set of opportunities, human 
capital is also related to this process. Human capital refers to the skills and abilities that 
an individual possess. For example, degree from a leading university may help a person 
secure a desirable job. However, once in that job, the person would benefit from the 
connections the job brings with it. In other words, human capital is converted, at least in 
part, into social capital. This is consistent with the saying ‘it is not what you know, but 
who you know’. Moreover, such ‘conversion’ is also possible in the opposite direction 
(e.g. a person can now apply for an even better job, building on the knowledge they 
obtained in a previous job). We are aware that social and human capital is deeply 
intertwined in people’s biographical history. However, by focusing on the social 
networks in which people are embedded at given points in time, we capture the social 
capital manifestation of both human and social dimensions.  
In essence networks are simply information channels, they do not replace 
information so much as they affect the flow of information and what people or firms can 
do with it (Burt, 2000). Network participants are not simultaneously aware of the 
information within the network; communication takes time so the connections between 
individuals affect who knows what and when. Even if the information is of a high quality, 
and eventually reaches everyone, the fact that diffusion takes time means that  
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individuals with greater social capital are informed early or more broadly and thus have 
an advantage. 
To examine the relevance of social capital theory to compensation and firm 
performance, we construct a complete interlocking-directorship network that includes 
not only the direct ties between one executive or outside director and another, but also 
the indirect ties, those that are generated by a friend of a friend. In this network we draw 
on social capital theory to determine which connections are “better”. We measure two 
forms of connectedness: closeness centrality which we refer to as “closeness”, and 
aggregate dyadic constraint which we refer to as “brokerage position”. In the Appendix 
we provide a detailed description of how these measures are calculated.  
Closeness captures the centrality of the executive or outside director and reflects 
how near that individual is to all others in the social network. It is defined as the inverse 
of the shortest path between an individual and all other individuals reachable from it, 
and measures how close an actor is to all other actors or how central the actor is in the 
network, after taking into account the centrality of all the other actors. Closeness 
therefore refers to how efficiently and effectively the individual can communicate with 
others by either communicating directly or through intermediaries. Taking into account 
the size of the network, a director with high closeness can quickly transmit and receive 
information. The shorter the social distance of an individual from others in the network, 
the higher the quality of information available to that individual: information is going to 
pass through fewer intermediaries and therefore arrive sooner and be more accurate 
and detailed. This is particularly important since information quality deteriorates as it 
moves from one person to the next in a chain of intermediaries. Such an individual can  
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access resources more easily, monitor the information flow more effectively, and have a 
better view of the activity in the network (Freeman, 1980). Closeness is a holistic 
measure, as it incorporates the aggregate impact of the entire network on the potential 
strengths and weaknesses embedded in each of the directors’ positions.  
Our second measure of connectedness is dyadic constraint (‘brokerage 
position’). It quantifies the degree to which the executive or outside director can serve 
as an effective broker in a network. The lower the executive's dyadic constraint, within 
her network of connections, the more likely she is to serve effectively as a broker. Thus, 
a good brokerage position is negatively related to the dyadic constraint. Burt (1992) 
developed dyadic constraint by building on Granovetter (1973, 1974) studies, which are 
based on the idea that a person can benefit from serving as a link between two or more 
otherwise disconnected or loosely connected groups in a network. Burt (2005) labels 
such positions as “structural holes” and suggests that individuals who bridge these 
holes are in a brokerage position, have access to a wider diversity of information, early 
access to that information, and more control over information diffusion. On the contrary 
those individuals with a constrained network position (i.e. no structural holes, where 
everyone is highly interconnected) have redundant ties, which lowers the potential 
efficacy of those ties (Burt, 2005). For example, if director A is interlocked with director 
B and director C, then that connection would be less effective for director A if directors  
B and C are also interlocked, because A is more likely to receive similar information 
from both B and C. In addition, redundancy in an individual’s connections can also 
constrain his or her actions, because information on such actions flows in paths that are  
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not independent of the person’s direct influence (e.g. B and C can exchange information 
about A).  
These two measures depict different dimensions of an individual’s 
connectedness. While closeness measures how accessible information is to the 
individual, brokerage position measures to what degree that information gives her 
relative advantage over her network neighbours. Overall these measures capture the 
idea that being better-connected is not about how many people an individual is directly 
connected to but more about the quality of those connections e.g. who her connections 
are connected too. 
All the informational advantages of connectedness discussed above can also be 
applied to the firm level. Certainly one can argue that a firm establishes connections 
through their inter-connected directors. In other words the network position of a firm’s 
individual directors collectively yields a network position for the firm. Or alternatively, the 
sum of the individuals’ social capital represents the stock of social capital of an 
organization (Burt, 2005). We therefore measure the closeness (brokerage) position of 
each firm by aggregating the closeness (brokerage) for each director within the firm. 
Although one cannot choose a specific network position, a director can increase 
the likelihood of a better position in terms of closeness by serving on a board where 
there are already highly visible directors, given the argument above about visibility and 
connectedness. To increase the likelihood of a better position in terms of brokerage, a 
director would choose to serve on more than one board of a company that do not share 
directors with one another or are in different industries. In so doing, the director would  
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increase the chance that by sitting on these boards, he or she would connect previously 
unconnected areas of the network and thus be in a beneficial brokerage position.  
 
3. Prior literature and hypotheses 
Because executives and outside directors perform different roles within an organization, 
it is possible that “connectedness” might have different resource benefits and for this 
reason will be valued very differently by the firm. This is especially important to consider 
given the variation of outside director compensation within and across firms here in the 
UK.
3 Hence, we present the corresponding literature and hypothesis separately for 
executive and outside directors.  
3.1. CEOs and other executive officers 
There are currently two views regarding corporate executive pay. One view argues that 
CEOs’ pay follows a well-executed pay-for-performance model (Kay and Van Putten, 
2007). The second view suggests that rising executive pay is unrelated to firm 
performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). These authors argue that executive officers 
can exert power and influence the decision control function of outside directors in 
relation to their compensation. According to this power hypothesis, the more power 
executives exert, the higher the compensation they receive and the more they 
expropriate wealth from shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  
Most of the prior literature examines CEO compensation under a variety of 
corporate governance structures. The results suggest that firms with weaker 
governance structures pay their CEOs more (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Core et al., 
                                                 
3 In the UK there is no maximum threshold for outside director pay. It is very common for directors within a firm to 
receive different levels of pay. Whilst in the US a fixed fee for outside directorships is very common.  
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1999). These authors find that CEO compensation is higher when the board is larger; 
the proportion of outside directors appointed during the CEO tenure increases; and 
when the board includes CEO interlocking directorships (Hallock, 1997).  
Recent work has investigated whether CEOs’ social connections are associated 
with large compensation packages. For example, Larker et al. (2005) find that CEOs are 
able to extract economic rents when they have links with directors who serve on the 
board’s compensation committee. Main et al. (1995) find that compensation committees 
whose chairs are appointed after the CEO takes office tend to award higher CEO 
compensation. Barnea and Guedj (2007) find that firms whose directors have high 
centrality tend to award their CEOs with higher compensation, although the 
compensation is less sensitive to firm performance. Hwang and Kim (2009) find that 
socially dependent boards in which the outside directors have social ties to the CEO 
offer higher pay levels to their CEOs. Brown et al. (2008) find that the social ties CEOs 
form over their corporate careers are positively related to their compensation and 
inversely related to pay-performance sensitivity. All these results suggest that the 
connectedness of executives has important implications for the efficacy of corporate 
governance.  
If the executive’s remuneration is efficiently priced and connections provide the 
executive with resources that enable her to be a better decision manager, then the more 
valuable these resources are to the firm and the higher will be her compensation. 
Alternatively, if executives' connections provide them with managerial power, then 
executives might be able to extract economic rent by influencing the board and 
negotiating a more favorable remuneration package. Both scenarios suggest that  
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executives who have high levels of closeness and a better brokerage position earn 
higher levels of compensation. Thus, our first hypothesis is:  
H1: An executive officer’s compensation level is positively associated with her closeness 
and brokerage position. 
3.2. Outside directors 
From a corporate governance perspective, outside directors and interlocking 
directorships perform two functions (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). First, boards use 
outside directors to enhance the monitoring of management on behalf of the 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and therefore reduce agency costs and 
improve a firm’s performance (Fama, 1980; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Second, outside 
directors provide resources to the firm (Johnson et al., 1996). For example, board 
members can serve as ‘boundary spanners’ (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) who provide 
access to communication channels with the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Such board members provide their firm with access to new information (Allen, 
1974). These resources can, in turn, help reduce dependencies between the firm and 
external contingencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), enhance organizational legitimacy 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989), reduce uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972), and lower transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1984). Thus, these resources impact firm decision making (Mizruchi, 
1996) and improve a company’s performance and solvency (Mizruchi and Stearns, 
1988). 
Given these findings, social capital theory provides an ideal framework for 
examining what determines a firm’s demand for outside directors, and ultimately, the 
level of their compensation. If outside directors can use their connections to become  
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better monitors, then the better the monitoring an outside director provides, the higher is 
her compensation. Prior research finds that outside directors who hold a more central 
position in their network of inter-board connections and who show a high brokerage 
position provide legitimacy, which improves the status of the firm (Davis and Greve, 
1997); links the firm to other important entities (Hillman et al., 2001); facilitates access 
to outside financing (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Johnson et al., 1996); helps in 
strategic decision making (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989); and provides information, 
expertise, and advice (Westphal, 1999).  
Whether or not outside directors with high levels of closeness and brokerage 
position are more capable monitors is not clear. Individuals in such positions are likely 
to have an informational advantage over others, and are more likely to be experienced 
and highly reputable. Therefore, if they utilize their information advantages and if they 
are willing to risk their reputations, then they might provide effective monitoring of the 
firm’s executive layer. However, by occupying central locations in their social networks, 
it might be difficult for them to serve as effective monitors of others to whom they are 
either directly or in some other way very closely connected (Barnea and Guedj, 2007; 
Larker et al., 2005). As Powell and Smith-Doerr (1997) note "… the ties that bind may 
also be the ties that blind". Alternatively, by having more connections, outside directors 
might become even more independent because they are less reliant on any single firm 
for their compensation and social connections. These connections can motivate them to 
be more independent and better capable of, for example, raising an independent voice 
at board meetings. Thus, such outside directors can serve as more effective monitors.   
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Even if the connections of outside directors enable them to become better 
monitors, this better monitoring might not lead directly to higher levels of compensation. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that many outside directors are either executives or 
important decision agents in other organizations, and that they use their outside 
directorships to signal their reputation as experts in decision control. Consequently they 
are much more focused on the reputational effects than on salary. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) suggest that such signals are only credible when the direct payments to outside 
directors are small. Under this scenario, a negative relation would exist between outside 
directors’ compensation and their closeness and brokerage position. Therefore, we 
write a non-directional hypothesis, as follows: 
H2: An outside director’s compensation level is associated with her closeness and 
brokerage position.   
3.3. A firm’s connectedness and future profitability 
The existing literature suggests that if a director’s connectedness generates useful 
resources then collectively these resources will be associated to the firm’s profitability. 
For example, Haunschild and Beckman (1998) find that a director’s connectedness 
provides information which influences the strategic choices of firms. A firm whose 
individuals are more central to the network will have more opportunities to access all 
network information, and access it in a timelier manner. For example the firm will have 
better access to the latest business practices and have a better view of the overall 
business environment. Barr (2000) finds that social capital in the form of social 
relationships embedded within bounded institutional or diffused community structures 
influences economic performance. This is partly because such networks facilitate the  
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flow of technical information and knowledge that helps reduce economic transitions 
costs as well as serve as crucial input in the production process. Fernandez et al. 
(2000) measured the ‘instrumental’ value to a firm of its employees’ social network. 
Within the context of a large U.S. customer service call center, the authors find that the 
firm’s social capital investments (reflected in the $250 referral bonus given to current 
employees for each successful hire who lasted through a specified time period) resulted 
in gathering a ‘net benefit’ through the firm’s acquiring a ‘richer pool’ of candidates. 
Likewise, if connectedness of an outside director enables her to increase her 
efficacy as a monitoring agent then the firm’s agency costs will also decrease and 
potentially the firm’s performance will improve. Consequently we would expect to see a 
positive association between a firm’s connectedness and the firm’s current and future 
performance. Unless the profitability or valuation of the company already reflects the 
benefits coming from the resources provided by its executives and outside directors, 
then the future performance will be unrelated to these services, after controlling for 
current performance.  
In addition, given our definition of rent extraction as a situation whereby the 
director’s compensation is positively correlated with their network measures, but not 
with future performance of the company (controlling for current performance). Our 
regression model focuses on this definition and tests if these conditions exist. If better-
connected executives and outside directors receive higher compensation partly 
because their connections provide them with opportunities to extract economic rents, 
then the association between the firm’s connectedness and its future performance will  
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be negative. If this is not the case then we can rule out rent extraction. Thus, our third 
hypothesis is:    
H3: The firm’s closeness or brokerage position is associated with its future performance. 
 
4. Sample and research design 
4.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of nearly all the UK companies on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) that are listed on either the Main or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
between 2000 and 2007. We obtain executive and outside director’s compensation data 
mainly from Hemscott, with other completions from BoardEx, and all stock market and 
accounting data from DataStream and Worldscope.  
To calculate the network measures for each individual, we construct a complete 
interlocking-director network that comprises 4,278 firms, 31,495 directors
4, and 111,114 
directorship-years.
5 After excluding observations with missing or zero compensation, the 
final sample for the econometric analysis contains 3,332 firms, 21,970 directors, and 
76,241 directorship-years (see Table 1).
6 The firms are from a wide range of industries 
and vary significantly in terms of size; firms range from a market value of £100 million to 
a market value of £158 billion.  
[Insert Table 1] 
We obtain compensation data for each executive and outside director from 
Hemscott. Hemscott calculates total compensation as the sum of salary, bonus, stock 
options, pension benefits, and other benefits. Because Hemscott excludes 
                                                 
4 Director in this paper is used as a collective term to describe both executive officers and outside directors. 
5 All 31,495 directors are connected to each other (directly or indirectly), in one or more of the years. 
6 See appendix for details about the calculation of network measures.  
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compensation from long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) that are widely used in the UK 
instead of stock option schemes, we obtain data on LTIPs from BoardEx. However, 
after matching the two databases we are unable to obtain LTIPs data for about 30% of 
our Hemscott sample (mainly AIM firms). Therefore, in our primary analysis we use the 
compensation data from Hemscott without LTIPs. However, we report results also using 
the smaller sample with LTIP data. 
There are two more reasons why excluding LTIPs from the primary analysis 
might be preferable. First, because the amount of compensation that is ultimately 
received from LTIPs is uncertain at the time the compensation is agreed and the LTIPs' 
valuation is not straightforward. Second, because outside directors are not usually 
included in LTIPs. This lacuna impairs the comparability in compensation across 
director categories. We would like to maintain this comparability, since it makes it 
possible for us to infer whether social networks have a differential impact on 
compensation. 
Table 1 provides the statistics at the firm level. The average firm closeness is 
0.087 with a standard deviation of 0.049, and average firm brokerage (dyadic 
constraint) is 0.662 with a standard deviation of 0.226.  We find that both closeness and 
brokerage exhibit high levels of persistence, with first-order autocorrelations of 0.7 and 
0.8, respectively. The average firm size is £953 million with a standard deviation of 
£6146 million. The average stock return is 16% and the average sales growth is 12%. In 
contrast, the average return on assets (ROA) is negative (-4.0%), although 65% of the 
observations do have a positive ROA. Average market-to-book ratio (MTB) is 2.51 and 
the median board has seven members.  
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Table 2 Panels A and B, provide the statistics by category of director.
7  CEOs 
have the highest average compensation of £447,000 (with LTIPs, this total rises to 
£577,000), followed by other senior executives and CFOs (see Panel A).
8 Chairmen of 
boards have a much lower average compensation of £102,000 (with LTIPs, £88,000). 
Other outside directors have an average compensation of £36,000 (with LTIPs, 
£32,000) (See Panel A). The average closeness for CEOs and CFOs is 0.08 and 0.09 
respectively with a standard deviation of 0.05 and 0.047. The average CEO brokerage 
(one minus the dyadic constraint) is 0.65 with a standard deviation of 0.21. Again we 
find that both closeness and brokerage exhibit high levels of persistence, with first-order 
autocorrelations of 0.8 and 0.9, respectively.  Outside directors have moderately higher 
levels of closeness and brokerage position relative to executive officers with an average 
closeness of 0.1 and brokerage of 0.77 (see Panel B). The median CEO tenure is 
approximately seven years, two years longer than for both CFO and other outside 
directors. In addition the CEO’s are more likely to have attended a top school, such as 
Oxford or Cambridge etc. and obtained an MBA compared to other directors.    
From the directorships in our data set, 15% also include a position on the 
nomination committee, 38% on the remuneration committee, and 45% on the audit 
committee. Also individuals who sit on three or more boards (busy directors) hold 17% 
percent of the directorships. Men hold 95% of directorships. 
[Insert Table 2] 
                                                 
7  We note that although we obtain a director’s job classification from Hemscott, that database is not complete, so at 
times it is difficult to unambiguously classify a director. For example, for some companies the chairperson might 
also be the CEO of the firm. Although this is not the case (>95%) for the majority of UK companies, we might be 
misclassifying some directors to other categories. However, we do not expect this misclassification to bias our 
results in one direction, but rather to add noise, reducing the power of the tests. We classify any directors as CEOs if 
they are both a CEO and a chairperson. 
8 The average compensation with LTIPs is lower because the majority of data points are missing for the executive 
officers that tend to receive the highest compensation.  
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4.2. Research design 
To test whether there is an association between an executive’s and an outside director’s 
compensation and her connectedness, we use the following model: 
     
Compijt  1Social Network Measureit 2Genderi 3Busyit
4HumanCapitalMeasuresit 5Jobijt 6Committeeijt
7Firm Characteristicsjt 8Indexjt  IIndustryjt 
I1
44
 tTimeijt
t2000
2007
 ijt
    (1) 
 
Where Compijt is the natural log of the total compensation for director i, in firm j in year t 
and the Social Network Measureit which is either closeness or brokerage position for 
director i in year t.  
We include several control variables to capture possible economic determinants 
of directors’ pay. We control for the gender of the director and for whether the director is 
a ‘busy’ director (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Busy directors might be better 
compensated because of their high reputation or less well compensated because they 
have less time to spend on each firm. By including this variable we also alleviate any 
concerns that our variables capture the effect of being a busy board member. We also 
include a number of controls in an attempt to capture the directors’ human capital. We 
employ both informal (experience) and formal (education) human capital variables 
(Cressy, 1996).
9 We include the tenure and age of the director, since directors with 
higher tenure and older directors are more experienced and knowledgeable, and thus 
receive a relatively higher compensation (Murphy, 1999).
10 The formal human capital 
                                                 
9 The nationality of the directors is not included as a variable given there is no theory to suggest, both from a human 
capital perspective nor a network creating perspective, that a certain nationality is better or worse than another. 
10 We note that by controlling for tenure, we are essentially biasing against our predictions, since the tenure of a 
director partly reflects her social status.    
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variables relate to the director’s educational background. In particular we control for 
whether the director attended a top school.
11 We also control for the level of education 
achieved by the director, for example whether the director has a PhD, or if they have 
obtained an MBA and/or have any other professional qualifications such as the 
chartered accountant certificate. We use the general job descriptions in Hemscott to 
determine job-role fixed effects, and indicator variables that show whether an individual 
sits on the nomination, remuneration, or audit committees.  
In addition to these director-level characteristics variables we also, as in previous 
research, control for firm-level characteristics. We use the size of the firm, calculated as 
the logarithm of the market value of equity, which we expect to be positively correlated 
with compensation, since larger firms are more complex and therefore require more 
skilled executives (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). We measure the firm’s profitability and 
performance by using the market-to-book (MTB) ratio, which serves as our proxy for a 
firm’s growth opportunities, and we expect it to be positively related to compensation 
(Smith and Watts, 1992); the return on assets (ROA); the one-year total stock price 
return; and the one-year sales growth (Core et al., 2008). To capture any asymmetric 
relations, we inter-act the performance controls, with indicator variables that reflect 
whether the performance measures are positive or negative. We also include the 
number of board members, since Yermack (1996) finds that larger boards are more 
entrenched and thus are more likely to approve higher compensation packages. We 
control for the firm’s London Stock Exchange Index membership (Indexjt,), industry 
                                                 
11 We define top schools as Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard and the top London based universities (especially given 
their proximity to the UK business community) such as London School of Economics, London Business School, 
Imperial College and University College London (UCL).  
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membership,
12 and year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the director level to 
mitigate serial and cross-directorship correlation within a director.  
Given that CEO compensation has attracted considerable attention relative to 
other directors, we consider CEOs separately. Likewise we also consider CFOs 
separately as we believe there is relatively more homogeneity in their job role than for 
other executives, thus reducing any potential noise.  
  To test whether there is an association between the firm’s connectedness and 
the firm’s subsequent performance, we run the following model: 
Performancejt,t2  1Firm' sSocial Network Measurejt12Performancejt1
3%outsidejt 4%Busyjt 5HumanCapitalMeasuresjt
 IIndustryjt 
I1
44
 tTimeijt
t2000
2007
  jt
 (2) 
We derive the firm’s social network measure by aggregating the firm’s individual 
director’s connectedness.  We also assess the sensitivity of our results to this method 
and construct the average director’s connectedness to obtain firm level connectedness. 
The dependent variable Performancejt, t+2, is the firm performance averaged over the 
subsequent one-, two- and three-year period.
13 We use three different measures of firm 
performance: total stock return, market-to-book and return on assets (Core et al., 1999). 
We also include as an independent variable the lag firm performance variable 
Performancejt-1, to control for the endogeneity of the firm’s selection process, i.e., that 
the better-performing firms choose better directors who are better-connected and as a 
                                                 
12 We use five LSE index membership classifications: FTSE 100, FTSE250, FTSE350, core AIM and Fledging 
AIM, and 44 industry classifications. 
13 This approach is consistent with the method used in other studies (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; 
Hwang and Kim, 2009).  
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result provide relatively higher quality service. We therefore control for historical factors 
that might be the cause for current differences in performance (Wooldridge, 2001).  
We do not expect stock returns to be serially correlated, although we expect MTB 
and ROA, to exhibit high persistence over time. In model 2 we also use controls for 
other board characteristics that prior studies suggest are related to a firm’s 
performance. We include controls for board size (Yermack, 1996), the percentage of 
independent directors sitting on the board (%outside) (Klein, 1998), and the percentage 
of busy directors (%Busy) (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). In addition we also include a 
number of variables to capture the director’s main human capital attributes: experience 
and educational attainment. We therefore include average tenure of the directors; the 
proportion of directors within the firm that have been educated at a top school and the 
proportion of directors that have obtained professional qualifications, e.g. MBA, ACA, 
ACCA, PhD. We also control for the firm’s industry membership and year fixed effects. 
 
5. Results 
 [Insert Table 3] 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrices. Panel A is the correlation matrices for CEOs 
and other executives and Panel B is the correlation matrices for chairmen and other 
outside directors. For CEOs (below diagonal), we find that compensation has a strong 
positive correlation with closeness (0.40) and brokerage position (0.48). For both 
chairman (below diagonal) and outside directors (above diagonal) we find the 
compensation has again a positive although weaker correlation with closeness and 
brokerage. For example the chairman’s compensation has a correlation with closeness  
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of 0.08 and with brokerage position of 0.15. For all categories of director compensation, 
closeness and brokerage are positively associated with firm size, ROA, and MTB. The 
human capital variables, top school, MBA, professional qualifications are all positively 
correlated to compensation, closeness and brokerage, although director tenure is 
weakly related to both measures of connectedness. Busy directors have higher 
closeness and better brokerage positions. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 (Panel A and B) presents the results from our model 1 regression 
analysis. Panel A reports the results for the executive officers and Panel B reports the 
results for outside directors. Panel A, columns 1 to 4 present the results for the CEOs. 
In columns 1 and 3, closeness exhibits a significant positive association with 
compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in closeness increases CEO 
compensation by approximately £20,500 (with LTIPs, £33,000).  Columns 2 and 4 show 
that the level of brokerage also has a significant positive association with compensation. 
Compensation has no relation to gender and is negatively associated to how busy the 
executive is. In unreported results we find compensation increases with tenure and 
particularly for CEO’s, attending Oxford University, or having either an ACA 
qualification, MBA, or PhD increases compensation.   
Because we control for factors, such as tenure, business, and committee 
membership, that might also be influenced by networks, the economic effects from 
network connections can be downward biased. When we test the same relations for 
CFOs, in columns 5 and 6 our results are nearly identical to those for CEOs. For the 
remaining executives we find similar results to those of CEOs and CFOs for closeness  
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which is positive and significantly associated to compensation. However, it does not 
appear that other executives are rewarded for their brokerage position, suggesting the 
firm does not find such a position in other executives useful. The coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The results overall provide 
evidence that firms compensate their executive officers according to their position in the 
social network and for the reciprocating resources. A move from the 10
th percentile to 
the 90
th percentile based on the closeness increases an executive’s compensation by 
approximately 9%.  
The results for non-executive directors, reported in Table 4, Panel B, are 
consistent with the executive results. We note that in this part of our analysis, if an 
individual is both an executive and an outside director, then we focus only on the 
compensation received from the outside directorship. For both Chairman (columns 1 to 
4) and other outside directors (columns 5 to 8) the network measures are positively and 
significantly associated to compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in 
closeness increases outside directors’ compensation by 6%. A move from the 10
th 
percentile to the 90
th percentile based on the brokerage position increases 
compensation by approximately 10%.   
  Both male and more experienced outside directors earn higher compensation, 
but busy directors earn lower compensation. Only Oxford University attendance and a 
chartered accounting qualification appear to be significantly related to an outside 
director’s compensation level.  
All these results suggest that compensation increases with an individual’s level of 
connectedness. This relation could be the result of an efficient contract between the firm  
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and the director, or because the director is able to exercise managerial power and 
extract economic rents. To distinguish between those two explanations we test the 
relation between the firm’s level of connectedness and its future performance. The 
results of model 2 are reported in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5] 
We find a firm’s connectedness is associated to its future performance. Better-
connected firms have better future performance. For instance when the dependent 
variable is either the firm’s average two- or three-year future stock return, the 
coefficients on the firm’s connectedness is 46.90 and 38.12 respectively, significant at 
the 0.1% level and 5% level. An increase of one standard deviation in the firm’s 
connectedness increases the firm’s two-year average future stock return by 4%, an 
estimate that is economically significant. When the stock return is replaced with either 
MTB or ROA the results are consistent. For example, when the dependent variable is 
three-year average MTB the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in the firm’s connectedness increases this three-year average MTB 
by approximately 19 points. An increase of one standard deviation in the firm’s 
connectedness variable increases ROA by approximately 0.22 points.  We find that both 
MTB and ROA exhibit high persistence, with coefficients ranging from 0.53 to 0.56 and 
from 0.46 to 0.62 respectively on past performance, respectively. In contrast, stock 
returns indicate no persistence. These results continue to hold when we replace the 
firm’s aggregate connectedness with the firm’s average connectedness. Similarly when 
we measure firm connectedness using brokerage as opposed to closeness our results 
are almost identical to those reported in Table 5. In other unreported results we find that  
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a firm’s performance is also positively associated to the proportion of a firm’s directors 
who attended a ‘top school’.
14 However, this association diminishes as the time horizon 
increases. For example, when the dependent variable is the average one-year stock 
return the ‘top school’ coefficient is 17.17 and significant at 0.1%, the coefficient then 
reduces to 7.20 when we move to an average two-year stock return and reduces again 
to 3.4 when we move to an average three-year stock return, neither is statistically 
significant. This suggests that human capital may have a limit in determining a firm’s 
future success suggested by Davidsson and Honig (2003) who find that human capital 
determines an individual’s entrance into a firm however, it does not determine an 
individual’s overall success once in the firm. Similarly, Boxman et al. (1991)  find human 
and social capital interact in producing income, but returns on human capital decrease 
when there is access to abundant social capital. 
 
Additional Analysis and Sensitivity tests 
5.1.1.  Alternative network measures 
Instead of using the closeness and brokerage (dyadic constraint) to capture a director’s 
connectedness, we investigate two alternative social network measures, betweenness 
centrality and K-core, which have been used in prior social capital research. 
Betweenness centrality of an individual j is defined as the ratio of the number of shortest 
paths connecting two individuals, i and k, that pass through individual j and the overall 
number of shortest paths that connect i and k (Freeman, 1980). This measure is 
normalized and ranges from zero to one. Similar to the dyadic constraint, betweenness 
                                                 
14 We also included as addition human capital variables MBA, PhD and ACA attainment, however none of these 
variables were found to be robust across all specifications.   
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captures how much information flows through a certain director, and thus the degree to 
which that director can serve as a broker between pairs of other directors. K-core is a 
particular area of the overall network (a sub-network) in which each director has at least 
k immediate neighbours. The higher the k of a director, the better-connected are her 
neighbours. Hence, she has fewer brokerage opportunities, her information is relatively 
less scarce, and her actions are more constrained (Moody and White, 2003). We divide 
this measure by the director’s degree. The higher the ratio, the less relative advantage 
the director’s information is likely to have. When using these measures all our results 
remain unchanged. 
5.1.2.  LSE compared to AIM 
A potential concern is that firms listed on the LSE main market are very different from 
the firms on the AIM market. By default, firms on the main market are larger and hence 
more visible, and subject to stricter governance structures relative to firms on the AIM. 
When we examine firms within the main market, we find that our results are stronger for 
these firms compared to firms listed on the AIM. Therefore, it appears that a director’s 
social network is more important for determining her compensation when her firm is 
listed on the main market.  
5.1.3. Linear  Relation 
In addition to investigating a linear relation between a director’s connectedness and her 
compensation we also investigate the possibility of a curvilinear relation. For example, a 
director incurs costs to maintain her many connections (Burt, 2005) but at the same 
time may receive diminishing returns from each incremental connection. Can you be too 
connected? We therefore include a quadratic measure of connectedness as an  
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additional variable, to address these concerns. We find although the quadratic term is 
negative, consistent with the idea of diminishing returns, it is not significant, nor does its 
inclusion change the previous results.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we use social network analysis to measure the connectedness of 
directors within the entire director network. We find that executives’ and outside 
directors’ compensation is associated with the characteristics of their social 
connections. Executive directors, such as CEOs, CFOs, and outside directors, such as 
chairmen, who have high levels of closeness and better brokerage positions earn higher 
compensation. We also find evidence that these aggregate connections which generate 
the firm’s connectedness are positively associated with future performance. This finding 
is inconsistent with managerial power and rent-extraction by executives, and consistent 
with executives receiving compensation for the resources they bring to a firm. Overall 
we find on average connections are beneficial to the individual as well as to their firm. 
Not all connections are bad connections.  
A number of caveats apply to this study. First, as in any network study, the social 
network is incomplete. Although director interlocks have been found to reflect social ties 
(Hwang and Kim, 2009), we do not capture all possible avenues through which a 
director can obtain an information advantage such as golf club memberships, religious 
activities, political affiliations etc. Nevertheless we believe these social or grey ties add 
noise to our network estimates potentially biasing downwards the network effect we 
document.  Second, whilst we have tried to control for human capital and its potential  
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endogeneity with our social capital measures, we cannot completely rule out that higher 
ability directors have a higher probability of acquiring better network positions. However 
we can take some comfort from the results of our analysis, that there appears to be 
diminishing returns from a director’s human capital e.g. educational attainment etc. in 
relation to future firm performance, as opposed to her social capital results. These 
results are consistent with prior research. Third, as with any study of this kind, there is a 
possibility of a correlated missing variable driving the results. However we have 
included numerous control variables which we think are the most likely causes of both 
director pay and firm performance.  
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Appendix 
 
Calculation of network measures 
 
Closeness centrality is the inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest 
path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable from it:  
  1
1
(, )
N v
w
N
uvw
X




 (A1) 
X is the closeness centrality of a vertex v in a network in which N is the number of 
vertices and u(v,w) is the distance between the given vertex (v) and another vertex (w). 
Therefore, using the example of a network below C has a closeness centrality of 
0.6111.  
 
Directors Closeness Directors Closeness 
A 0.4583 G 0.4074 
B 0.5500 H 0.3793 
C 0.6111  I  0.5500 
D 0.5000 J 0.3667 
E 0.5000 K 0.3928 
F 0.5500 L 0.2895 
 
This is calculated as (12-1) divided by the five direct ties to A, B, D, F and I with a 
distance of one (1+1+1+1+1) plus the indirect ties which take a geodesic distance of 
two for C to connect to E, G, H, J and K (2+2+2+2+2) plus the geodesic distance of 
three to connect to L. Thus closeness centrality is 11 divided by 18. In Pajek, the 
software package we use to calculate the network measures (Batagelj and Mrvar, 
G
A
B C
H
E
D
F
I K L
J 
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2009), closeness of each individual is weighted by the total number of individuals in the 
entire network. We only include the single biggest component for each year, but the 
closeness measure does reflect the fact that there were other components in the 
network.   
"Dyadic Constraint," the brokerage position, is based on Ronald Burt’s (1992) concept 
of structural holes. The simplest structure in which dyadic constraint is expressed is the 
triad, a fully or partially connected set of three nodes. Structures that are more complex 
can be decomposed into triads. Hence, the calculation of dyadic constraint is based on 
breaking down network structures to triads. Below is the breakdown of I’s ties, from the 
example above: 
 
Using Pajek (de Nooy et al., 2005) we calculate the aggregate dyadic constraint using 
the following dyadic constraint formula (Burt 1992, pp.54-55): 
2
,, ij ij iq qj
q
Cp p pf o r p i j

  
   (A2) 
where pij is the proportion of i’s relations invested in actor j. The sum  iq qj
q
p p  is the 
extent of i’s relations invested in actor q’s relations, which in turn are invested in actor j. 
The total in parentheses is the proportions of i’s relations that are directly or indirectly 
invested in its connections with actor j. We show the calculation of dyadic constraint for 
node I. First, we calculate the value of each of the ties that a node is part of as an 
inverse of its number of connections. Node I in the example above has four ties. Hence, 
I 
F 
C J
K
0.25 
0.25 
0.25  0.25 
0.25 
0.20 
Breakdown of I’s ties  
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each of node I’s ties will have a value of ¼, F ties will also have a value of ¼, and C will 
have a value of  1
5  and both J and K ties will have a value one and ½ respectively. 
Second, using the values of these ties, we calculate the constraint that each of the ties 
imposes on I. Since I is part of the triad C-F-I, the tie F-C is limiting the value that I can 
have had from having separate connections with C and F. Therefore, the constraint that 
each of these nodes imposes on I includes not only the node’s connection with I, but 
also the connection between them. The constraint on I attached to her tie with F is equal 
to the square of the following sum: 0.25 (I’s investment in F), plus 0.25 x 0.2 (I’s tie to C 
time’s C tie to F), which equals 0.09. Similarly, the constraint on I attached to her tie 
with C is equal to 0.0976 (i.e., [0.25 + (0.25x 0.25)]
2. The constraint with both J and K is 
just the squares of the proportional strengths of these ties (0.0625), because there are 
no indirect ties from I to either J or K. Once we have the dyadic constraint on all ties of I, 
we add them to obtain the aggregate constraint. Therefore, the aggregate constraint for 
I is 0.3126 (i.e. 0.09 + 0.0976 + 0.0625 + 0.0625). Based on the example above I is the 
least constrained director, and therefore holds the ‘best’ brokerage position within the 
entire network. I connects J, K and L to the other group containing C, F, D etc. From the 
example above A to F all tend to have similar information. Indeed, all the ties to D are 
redundant since D can only transmit information provided by B, C, E, and F, but cannot 
provide new and different information. 
Directors  Dyadic Constraint Directors Dyadic Constraint 
A 0.7003 G 0.6427 
B 0.3875 H 0.7847 
C  0.4097 I 0.3126 
D 0.5137 J 1.0000 
E 0.4648 K 0.5000 
F 0.4597 L 1.0000  
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Table 1 
 
The number of companies, directors, and observations used in constructing the network measures and 
the number of companies, directors and observation used in the final analysis. In addition the statistics for 
the final company sample. Firm closeness is the sum of the firm’s executive and outside director’s 
individual closeness. Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given 
vertex to other reachable vertices in the network. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to 
one. Firm brokerage position is the sum of the firm’s executive and outside director’s individual brokerage 
position. We measure brokerage position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one. The 
dyadic constraint measures the redundancy of a director’s ties. The measure is normalized and ranges 
from zero to one. A higher closeness and brokerage position indicates a better-networked firm. Stock 
return is the stock price return over one fiscal year. Sales growth is the growth in sales over one fiscal 
year. ROA is net income over total assets. MTB is market value of equity over book value of equity at 
fiscal year end.  
Measure 
Unique 
companies
Unique 
 directors 
Director- 
firm-year  
 
Network measures  4,278 31,495  111,114     
Excluding missing or zero compensation     946    9,525    34,873     
Analysis sample  3,332  21,970    76,241     
          
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Q3  Median  Q1 
Average firm closeness  0.087  0.049  0.120  0.105  0.078 
Average firm brokerage position  0.662  0.226  0.830  0.674  0.533 
Market Value of equity (£’m)  953  6146  236  48  12 
Stock return  16.0%  82.0% 30.0%  3.0%  -22.0% 
Sales growth  12.0%  47.0%  21.0%  9.0%  -2.0% 
ROA -4.0%  22.0%  6.0%  2.0%  -3.0% 
MTB 2.51  5.44  2.68  1.35  0.86 
% Outsider directors   57.5% 23.5%  71.4%  57.1%  42.9% 
% Busy directors  12.4%  33.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
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Table 2 
Panel A: Statistics for compensation, network measures and director educational background by 
category of executive. 
We define compensation (Comp) for each director as the sum of salary, bonus, stock options, pension 
benefits, and other benefits in thousands of pounds but we exclude the long-term incentive plans. Comp + 
LTIPs includes compensation from the long-term incentive plans. We define Closeness as the inverse of 
the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable 
from it. Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given vertex to 
other reachable vertices in the network. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. We 
measure brokerage position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one. The dyadic 
constraint measures the redundancy of a director’s ties. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero 
to one. A higher closeness and brokerage position indicates a better-networked executive or outside 
director. Director tenure is the number of years the director has been sitting on the board. Busy director is 
a director who serves in a year on three or more boards. Gender is a dummy variable and has a value of 
one if the individual is a male and zero if the individual is female. Top school is a dummy variable and has 
the value of one if the executive attended a top university such as: Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, LSE, 
LBS etc. and zero otherwise. MBA is a dummy variable and has the value of one if the executive holds a 
MBA qualification and zero otherwise.  
   Measure Mean  Std.  Dev Q3  Median  Q1 
(
1
)
 
C
E
O
 
Comp (£’000)  447  634  509  258  143 
Comp + LTIPs (£’000) 577  969  589  262  140 
Closeness    0.083 0.049    0.118  0.103  0.069 
Brokerage position   0.649 0.201  0.783  0.664  0.537 
Tenure   8.2  6.0  10.0  7.0  4.0 
Busy director   0.035 0.184   0.000   0.000  0.000 
Gender   0.977 0.151   1.000   1.000  1.000 
Top School   0.090 0.286   0.000   0.000  0.000 
MBA   0.052 0.223   0.000  0.000  0.000 
(
2
)
 
C
F
O
 
Comp (£’000)  265  309  320  174  99 
Comp + LTIPs (£’000) 361  506  393  190  102 
Closeness    0.085 0.047 0.118  0.104  0.078 
Brokerage  position  0.648 0.181 0.769  0.665  0.547 
Tenure  6.3 4.5 8.0  5.0  3.0 
Busy director  0.014  0.119 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Gender  0.948 0.222 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Top  School  0.069 0.253 0.000  0.000  0.000 
MBA  0.035 0.184 0.000  0.000  0.000 
(
3
)
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
E
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
Comp (£’000)  352  520  412  205  109 
Comp + LTIPs (£’000) 442  616  515  216  106 
Closeness  0.091 0.047 0.122 0.108 0.087 
Brokerage  position  0.710 0.165 0.823 0.729 0.618 
Tenure  6.5 4.4 8.0 5.0 3.0 
Busy director  0.018  0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Gender  0.949 0.221 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Top  School  0.069 0.254 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MBA  0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000  
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Table 2 
Panel B: Statistics for compensation, network measures and director educational background by 
category of outside director. 
We define compensation for each director as the sum of salary, bonus, stock options, pension benefits, 
and other benefits in thousands of pounds but we exclude the long-term incentive plans. Compensation 
plus LTIPs includes compensation from the long-term incentive plans. We define Closeness as the 
inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all other vertices 
reachable from it. Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given 
vertex to other reachable vertices in the network. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to 
one. We measure brokerage position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one. The 
dyadic constraint measures the redundancy of a director’s ties. The measure is normalized and ranges 
from zero to one. A higher closeness and brokerage position indicates a better-networked executive or 
outside director. Director tenure is the number of years the director has been sitting on the board. Busy 
director is a director who serves in a year on three or more boards. Gender is a dummy variable and has 
a value of one if the individual is a male and zero if the individual is female. Top school is a dummy 
variable and has the value of one if the executive attended a top university such as: Oxford, Cambridge, 
Harvard, LSE, LBS etc. and zero otherwise. MBA is a dummy variable and has the value of one if the 
executive holds a MBA qualification and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Measure Mean  Std.  Dev  Q3  Median  Q1 
(
1
)
 
C
h
a
i
r
m
a
n
 
Comp (£’000)  102  170  109  40  20 
Comp + LTIPs (£’000)  88  127  100  40  19 
Closeness 0.094 0.049  0.126  0.111  0.088 
Brokerage position  0.755 0.241  0.953  0.819  0.600 
Tenure 8.2  6.3  10.0  7.0  4.0 
Busy director  0.309 0.462 1.000  0.000  0.000 
Gender 0.985 0.121  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Top School  0.026 0.159  0.000  0.000  0.000 
MBA 0.007 0.084  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(
2
)
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
O
u
t
s
i
d
e
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
  Comp (£’000)  36  52  36  23  13 
Comp + LTIPs (£’000)  32  38  35  22  13 
Closeness   0.100  0.044  0.127  0.114  0.096 
Brokerage position  0.769  0.208  0.941  0.803  0.632 
Tenure 6.4  4.7  8.0  5.0  3.0 
Busy director  0.227  0.419 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Gender 0.933  0.251  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Top School  0.021  0.142  0.000  0.000  0.000 
MBA 0.010  0.098  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table 3 
Panel A: Correlation coefficients for the CEO (below diagonal) and other executive directors (above diagonal). 
We define comp (compensation) for each director as the sum of salary, bonus, stock options, pension benefits, and other benefits in thousands 
of pounds but we exclude the long-term incentive plans. Comp plus LTIPs includes compensation plus long-term incentive plans. We define 
Closeness as the inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable from it. 
Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given vertex to other reachable vertices in the network. The 
measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. We measure brokerage position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one.The 
dyadic constraint measures the redundancy of a director’s ties. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. A higher closeness and 
brokerage position indicates a better-networked executive or outside director. Firm size is the log of the firm’s market value of equity. Stock return 
is the stock price return over one fiscal year. Sales growth is the growth in sales over one fiscal year. ROA is net income over total assets. MTB is 
market value of equity over book value of equity at fiscal year end. Director tenure is the number of years the director has been sitting on the 
board. Busy director is a director who serves in a year on three or more boards. Top school is a dummy variable and has the value of one if the 
executive attended a top university such as: Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, LSE, LBS etc. and zero otherwise. MBA is a dummy variable and has 
the value of one if the executive holds a MBA qualification and zero otherwise. 
   Other Executive Directors 
   
Variable 
 
Comp  
Comp 
+ 
LTIPs  
 
Closeness 
Brokerage 
position 
Firm 
size 
Stock 
return 
Sales 
growth 
 
ROA 
 
MTB 
Director 
tenure 
Busy 
director 
Top 
School 
 
MBA 
C
E
O
 
Comp      0.962  0.356  0.456  0.658  -0.034  -0.065  0.281  0.022  0.155  -0.073  0.180  0.153 
Comp+ LTIPs  0.960    0.353  0.429  0.660  -0.014  -0.038  0.258  0.031  0.040  -0.083  0.198  0.165 
Closeness   0.385  0.392    0.645  0.504  0.004  -0.023  0.160  0.052  -0.036  0.093  0.150  0.113 
Brokerage position  0.480  0.480  0.649    0.684  -0.006  -0.041  0.235  0.043  -0.024  0.222  0.203  0.151 
Firm size   0.714  0.733  0.489  0.639    0.047  -0.038  0.362  0.094  -0.018  0.022  0.242  0.193 
Stock return  -0.012  0.019  -0.015  -0.007  0.069    0.082  0.020  0.099  -0.020  0.029  0.001  -0.001 
Sales growth  -0.030  -0.023  -0.016 -0.023  -0.012  0.071    -0.038  0.044  -0.082  0.008  -0.004  -0.013 
ROA 0.276  0.244  0.140  0.203  0.348  0.030  -0.018    -0.063  0.113  -0.023  0.065  0.049 
MTB 0.048  0.070  0.055  0.059  0.125  0.096  0.032  -0.047    -0.004  0.018  -0.008  -0.009 
Director tenure  0.207  0.124  0.005  0.080  0.093  -0.030  -0.074  0.195  -0.013    0.054  0.007  -0.044 
Busy  director  -0.024 -0.024  0.112  0.272  0.038 -0.012  0.000 0.006  0.003  0.081    0.032  -0.001 
Top school  0.215  0.242  0.184  0.238  0.268  -0.027  -0.026  0.075  0.012  0.003  0.054    0.210 
MBA 0.135  0.136  0.116  0.140  0.169  -0.018  -0.038  0.040  0.030  -0.031  -0.004  0.206   
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Table 3 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients for the independent chairman (below diagonal) and other outside directors (above diagonal). 
We define comp (compensation) for each director as the sum of salary, bonus, stock options, pension benefits, and other benefits in thousands 
of pounds but we exclude the long-term incentive plans. Comp plus LTIPs includes compensation plus long-term incentive plans. We define 
Closeness as the inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable from it. 
Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given vertex to other reachable vertices in the network. The 
measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. We measure brokerage position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one. 
The dyadic constraint measures the redundancy of a director’s ties. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. A higher closeness 
and brokerage position indicates a better-networked executive or outside director. Firm size is the log of the firm’s market value of equity. Stock 
return is the stock price return over one fiscal year. Sales growth is the growth in sales over one fiscal year. ROA is net income over total assets. 
MTB is market value of equity over book value of equity at fiscal year end. Director tenure is the number of years the director has been sitting on 
the board. Busy director is a director who serves in a year on three or more boards. Top school is a dummy variable and has the value of one if 
the executive attended a top university such as: Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, LSE, LBS Imperial, UCL. and zero otherwise. MBA is a dummy 
variable and has the value of one if the executive holds a MBA qualification and zero otherwise. 
 
   Outside directors 
 
 
Variable 
 
Comp  
Comp + 
LTIPs  
 
Closeness  
Brokerage 
position 
Firm 
size 
Stock 
return 
Sales 
growth 
 
ROA 
 
MTB 
Director 
tenure 
Busy 
director 
Top 
School 
 
MBA 
C
h
a
i
r
m
a
n
 
Comp      0.997  0.085  0.180  0.429  -0.004  0.024  0.090  0.060  0.119  -0.092  0.048  0.045 
Comp+ LTIPs  0.998    0.096  0.207  0.462  0.001  0.022  0.088  0.071  0.136  -0.078  0.035  0.037 
Closeness   0.080  0.065    0.663  0.400  -0.037  -0.050  0.148  0.014  -0.028  0.319  0.082  0.041 
Brokerage position  0.148  0.154  0.700    0.475  -0.024  -0.026  0.150  0.038  -0.043  0.518  0.120  0.062 
Firm size   0.545  0.553  0.376  0.401    0.068  0.028  0.293  0.138  -0.075  0.005  0.104  0.064 
Stock return  -0.004  0.000  -0.023  -0.007  0.096    0.100  0.025  0.081  -0.045  -0.016  0.001  -0.007 
Sales growth  0.022  0.028  -0.059  -0.025  0.036  0.086    -0.014  0.038  -0.073  -0.023  -0.002  -0.001 
ROA  0.117  0.112  0.165  0.142 0.316  0.044 -0.010    -0.044  0.065  0.035  0.017  -0.007 
MTB 0.068  0.085  0.007  0.044  0.117  0.094  0.041  -0.071    -0.045  -0.026  0.012  0.013 
Director tenure  0.164  0.127  -0.015  -0.054 0.074  -0.042 -0.079  0.153  -0.038    0.003  -0.030  -0.021 
Busy director  -0.150  -0.149  0.397  0.568  0.001 -0.018  -0.029 0.033 -0.013 -0.067    0.037  0.006 
Top  school  0.115 0.070  0.107  0.119  0.128  -0.009  0.010 0.014 0.029 0.012 0.053    0.243 
MBA  0.050 0.053  0.029  0.033  0.059  -0.014  -0.001 0.008 0.028 0.002  -0.018 0.209   
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Table 4 
Panel A: Association between compensation and connectedness for CEOs, CFOs and all other executive officers. 
The Table presents OLS tests in which the dependent variable is log of compensation. We define comp (compensation) for each director as the 
sum of salary, bonus, stock options, pension benefits, and other benefits in thousands of pounds but we exclude the long-term incentive plans. 
Comp plus LTIPs includes compensation plus the long-term incentive plans. We define Closeness as the inverse of the mean geodesic distance 
(i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable from it. Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to 
spread from a given vertex to other reachable vertices in the network. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. We measure 
brokerage position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one. The dyadic constraint measures the redundancy of a director’s ties. 
The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. A higher closeness and brokerage position indicates a better-networked executive or 
outside director. Gender is a dummy variable and has a value of one if the individual is a male and zero if the individual is female. Busy director is 
a director who serves in a year on three or more boards. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the director level. We 
tabulate t-statistics below the coefficients in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 0.1% level. 
 CEO  CFO  Other  Executives 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 Comp  Comp 
Comp 
+LTIPs 
Comp 
+LTIPs Comp 
 
Comp   Comp  Comp 
Comp 
+LTIPs 
Comp 
+LTIPs 
Intercept 4.28  4.21  4.27  4.17  3.87 3.79  4.63 4.69 5.44  5.61 
 (8.60)***  (8.22)*** (4.42)***  (4.16)***  (11.70)*** (11.13)*** (11.98)*** (11.85)*** (10.91)*** (10.82)*** 
Closeness  1.11   1.34    1.03   0.87   1.05   
  (4.19)***   (3.41)***    (4.24)***   (2.61)***   (2.18)**   
Brokerage position   0.22    0.23   0.20    -0.02   -0.22 
   (2.46)**    (1.66)*   (2.17)**    (-0.13)   (-1.12) 
Gender 0.09  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.07 0.07  0.15 0.15 0.18  0.18 
 (0.95)  (0.96)  (0.54)  (0.57)  (1.37)  (1.34)  (3.29)*** (3.31)*** (2.39)*** (2.44)*** 
Busy director  -0.30  -0.33  -0.39  -0.42  -0.34  -0.37  -0.44  -0.40  -0.55  -0.46 
 (-3.61)***  (-3.99)***  (-3.29)***  (-3.55)***  (-2.46)**  (-2.65)*** (-3.35)*** (-3.09)*** (-3.20)*** (-2.64)***
                    
Human capital controls  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job role fixed effects  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Committee fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R squared  59.2%  59.1%  61.2% 61.1%  60.4% 60.3% 59.8% 59.7% 60.6% 60.6% 
Number of observations  9503  9503  4656  4656  7714  7714  10091  10091  5201  5201 
Number  of individuals  3650  3650  2412  2412  3000  3000  4300  4300  2756  2756 
Number of firms  2393  2393  1741  1741  2119  2119  1717  1717  1245  1245   45
Table 4 
Panel B: Association between compensation and connectedness for chairman and all other outside directors. 
The Table presents OLS test in which the dependent variable is compensation. We define comp (compensation) for each director as the sum of 
salary, bonus, stock options, pension benefits, and other benefits in thousands of pounds but we exclude the long-term incentive plans. Comp plus 
LTIPs includes compensation plus the long-term incentive plans. We define Closeness as the inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the 
shortest path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable from it. Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread 
from a given vertex to other reachable vertices in the network. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. We measure brokerage 
position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one. The dyadic constraint measures the redundancy of a director’s ties. The 
measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. A higher closeness and brokerage position indicates a better-networked executive or outside 
director. Gender is a dummy variable and has a value of one if the individual is a male and zero if the individual is female. Busy director is a 
director who serves in a year on three or more boards. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the director level. We 
tabulate t-statistics below the coefficients in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 0.1% level. 
 
   Chairman  All other outside directors 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Comp  Comp  Comp+LTIPs Comp+LTIPs Comp  Comp  Comp+LTIPs Comp+LTIPs
Intercept 3.69  3.66  3.60  3.58  2.75  2.66  2.62  2.50 
 (8.62)*** (8.65)*** (7.28)***  (7.34)***  (16.01)*** (14.98)*** (11.18)***  (10.45)*** 
Closeness  0.71   0.60    0.95   0.81   
  (2.18)**   (1.64)*    (3.45)***   (2.66)***   
Brokerage position   0.22    0.20   0.26    0.30 
   (2.53)**    (2.33)**   (3.43)***   (3.51)*** 
Gender 0.28  0.24  0.37  0.33 0.07  0.07  0.06  0.05 
 (1.81)*  (1.69)*  (2.11)**  (2.04)**  (2.91)**  (2.81)**  (2.53)**  (2.43)** 
Busy director  -0.17  -0.21  -0.12  -0.16  -0.07  -0.12  -0.04  -0.09 
 (-6.37)*** (-6.13)*** (-4.65)***  (-5.06)***  (-5.18)*** (-4.65)***  (-2.63)**  (-3.45)*** 
                
Human capital controls  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Job role fixed effects  No  No No  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Committee fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm controls  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Index fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Adj-R squared  55.2%  55.2%  55.5%  55.5% 36.8% 36.9% 38.8%  38.9% 
Number of observations  11429  11429  8623  8623  37504  37504  31553  31553 
Number  of individuals  3548  3548  3164  3164  11684  11684  10765  10765 
Number of firms  3072  3072  2808  2808  3197  3197  3085  3085 
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Table 5  
Association between a firm’s closeness and its future performance Panel A present OLS tests in which the dependent variable is future firm 
performance. Average firm closeness is the sum of each firm’s individual directors closeness divided by the number of directors on the board. 
Closeness is the inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable from it. 
Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given vertex to other reachable vertices in the network. The 
measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. A higher closeness indicates a better-networked firm. Market-to-book is the market value of 
equity over book value of equity at fiscal year end. Return-on assets is net income over total assets. Firm size is the logarithm of the market value 
of equity when dependent variable is stock return. We average all performance variables across the estimation or test period. Busy director is a 
director who serves in a year on three or more boards. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. We tabulate t-statistics below the 
coefficients in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 0.1% level. 
Dependent variables:  Stock return  Market-to-book (MTB)  Return-on-assets (ROA) 
 
(1) 
One-year 
(2)  
Two-year 
(3) 
Three-year
(4) 
One-year 
(5)  
Two-year 
(6) 
Three-year
(7) 
One-year 
(8)  
Two-year 
(9) 
Three-year
Intercept  -28.76  -6.77 3.77 0.02 0.32 0.52  -4.33  -3.57  -2.09 
 (-9.18)*** (-2.11)**  (1.15)  (-0.16)  (1.90)*  (2.55)**  (-4.54)***  (-3.12)**  (-1.67)* 
Aggregate firm closeness   22.14 46.09  38.12  1.87  2.60 3.32  11.76  17.16  15.13 
  (1.71)*  (3.15)*** (2.62)**  (4.49)*** (4.68)*** (5.03)*** (3.30)*** (3.92)*** (3.1)** 
Lag stock return  0.04  -0.002  0.001             
  (3.19)*** (-0.20)  (0.04)         
Lag  market-to-book  -2.28  -1.94 -1.68 0.56 0.53 0.56       
 (-8.07)*** (-6.88)***  (-5.46)***  (33.95)*** (25.87)***  (23.55)***       
Lag  return-on-assets          0.62  0.54  0.46 
          (35.96)*** (25.56)*** (21.7)*** 
Firm  size  -0.38  -0.71  -0.60         
  (-1.2)  (-2.16)**  (-1.81)*         
% Outsider directors  4.74  2.67  2.24  0.05  0.01  -0.86  2.47  2.92  2.98 
 (1.81)*  (1.03)  (0.85)  (0.54)  (0.10)  (-0.57)  (2.84)**  (3.08)**  (2.96)** 
% Busy directors  -2.21  -6.22  -4.61  -0.05  -0.15  -0.22  -1.47  -2.07  -1.32 
  (-0.91)  (-2.35)**  (-1.7)* (-0.60) (-1.59) (-1.81)*  (-1.87)*  (-2.03)** (0.28) 
Human capital controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed affects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N  6934 5664 4457 7021  5736 4501 7240  5893 4644 
Adj-R squared  25.49%  23.23% 18.61% 51.71% 47.18% 46.81% 50.13% 49.01% 47.02%
 